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ABSTRACT
We explore the use of policy approximation for reducing the computational cost of learning Nash
equilibria in multi-agent reinforcement learning scenarios. We propose a new algorithm for zero-sum
stochastic games in which each agent simultaneously learns a Nash policy and an entropy-regularized
policy. The two policies help each other towards convergence: the former guides the latter to the
desired Nash equilibrium, while the latter serves as an efficient approximation of the former. We
demonstrate the possibility of using the proposed algorithm to transfer previous training experiences
to different environments, enabling the agents to adapt quickly to new tasks. We also provide a
dynamic hyper-parameter scheduling scheme for further expedited convergence. Empirical results
applied to a number of stochastic games show that the proposed algorithm converges to the Nash
equilibrium while exhibiting a major speed-up over existing algorithms.
Keywords Reinforcement Learning, Nash Equilibrium, Game Theory
1 Introduction
Both biological and artificial intelligent agents tend to follow goal-directed behaviors in order to survive and achieve
desired outcomes. Learning to choose actions that maximize rewards is the foundation behind reinforcement learning
(RL) [1]. While the success of RL has been demonstrated in many single agent domains [2, 3], more work is needed to
extend the same results to multi-agent scenarios. The difficultly of extending single-agent RL methods to multi-agent
scenarios stems from the fact that the interactions between the agents make learning difficult, since changes in the
policy of one agent will affect that of the others, and vice versa [4].
One widely adopted framework to address multi-agent systems is via Stochastic Games (SG). The resulting multi-agent
reinforcement learning (MARL) framework assumes a group of autonomous agents that share a common environment
in which the agents choose actions independently and interact with each other [5] to reach an equilibrium. When all
agents are rational, and under the assumption of common knowledge, the most natural solution concept is the one of a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) [6–8].
The blanket assumptions of perfect rationality makes computing NE challenging for many scenarios, especially those
involving more than a handful of alternative strategies. There is a need for algorithms that generate rational, yet
computationally efficient policies that can be used in a wide variety of multi-agent situations. Several approaches
have been proposed to find alternative ways to compute policies in multi-agent scenarios. One popular approach is
to simplify the learning problem [9–12] and thus allow the agents to compute “fast” but less rational policies. Such
algorithms are unlikely to converge to a rational (Nash) equilibrium, however. Other algorithms learn directly a NE using
computationally demanding operators [13–16], such as Minimax-Q [13] and Nash-Q [14]. Under certain conditions,
agents using these algorithms are more logical/rational (in the sense that they try to compute NE) but in doing so, they
tend to take more time to compute the corresponding policies.
Intelligent agents also tend to efficiently utilize prior knowledge to learn new tasks and develop important competen-
cies [17]. Entropy-regularized soft Q-learning [18], originally introduced to address the maximization-bias, has the
potential of transferring previous experiences to new environments by incorporating a prior (a reference policy or a
previously learnt policy) thus restricting exploration only to policies close to the prior. The soft Q-learning idea was
recently extended to two-agent zero-sum and team games [19]. This two-agent Soft-Q algorithm avoids the use of the
expensive Nash operator to update the game value at each learning step; the two agents, instead, compute closed-form
soft-optimal policies under entropy regularization that explore the policy space close to the priors. Since none of the
agents computes Nash policy, the output policies of the two-agent Soft-Q may be far from optimal.
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To achieve convergence to NE while maintaining computational efficiency, we propose a new entropy-regularized
Q-learning algorithm for zero-sum games, called Soft Nash Q2-learning (SNQ2). The proposed algorithm learns two
different Q-values: the standard Q-value and the soft Q-value. The two values are used asynchronously in a “feedback”
learning mechanism: the soft-Q policies act as an efficient approximation of the Nash policies to update the standard
Q-value; the Nash policies from the standard Q-value are periodically used to update the priors guiding the soft-Q
policies. Consequently, SNQ2 significantly reduces the frequency of using the expensive Nash operator (Minimax
in the zero-sum case), and thus expedites convergence to the NE. Furthermore, the priors used in the soft-Q policy
updates provide the opportunity to transfer knowledge from previous training experience or from human experts to a
new environment, and thus “warm-start” the learning process. This is demonstrated in the numerical examples section
of the paper.
Since the balance between the learning of the two Q-values plays a critical role in the performance of the SNQ2
algorithm, we also introduce a dynamic scheduling scheme that actively changes the frequency of the updates of the
priors with the new Nash policies. We empirically show the convergence of SNQ2 to a Nash equilibrium for several
stochastic games demonstrating major speed-up over existing algorithms.
2 Related Work
Games, first explored in the economics community [20,21], offer a natural framework to generalize single-agent Markov
Decision Processes [6] to multi-agent settings. The simplest approach to extend learning in multi-agent settings is to
use independently learning agents. This was the approach with the use of Q-learning in [22], but such approach fails
in many cases due to the nonstationarity of the environment [4]. Some previous works addressed nonstationarity by
introducing an extra mechanism, such as centralized critic [10, 23], conjectures on other agents’ policies [9], variable
learning rates [12], and neural fictitious play [24].
Many of these works ensure convergence to a NE only in simple versions of stochastic games, such as repeated
games [25]. Other algorithms are designed specifically for cooperative settings, such as, optimistic and hysteretic
Q-updates [26–28], policy parameter sharing [29] and applications to Markov team games [16]. Deep Learning
techniques, such as deep Q-learning, have also been investigated for multi-agent scenarios; see, for example [30].
While these approaches may be computationally tractable, they are either not applicable in competitive settings or lack
guarantees of convergence to a NE, a critical concept in competitive games [7]. Approaches that focus on solving for NE
policies on the other hand [13–15], although principled, are generally computationally demanding due to the complexity
of computing a NE [31]. Different methods have been investigated to alleviate this problem. The algorithm in [32]
applies a mean field approximation to simplify the interactions within a population of agents to that of a single agent
and the average effect from the rest of the population. The algorithm in [33] uses approximate dynamic programming to
reduce complexity. M3DDPG [34] uses a minimax formulation to extend the popular MADDPG [10] algorithm to
competitive settings. These algorithms still rely on performing rather expensive minimax operations, and they could
still potentially benefit from the ideas utilized in the proposed SNQ2 algorithm.
3 Background
Two-agent Zero-sum Stochastic Games. In two-agent stochastic games two agents, henceforth referred to as the
Player (pl) and the Opponent (op), interact in the same stochastic environment. In this paper we are interested, in
particular, in zero-sum games where one of the agent’s gain is the other agent’s loss [7]. A zero-sum stochastic game
is formalized by the tuple 〈S,Apl,Aop, T ,R, γ〉, where S denotes a finite state space, and Apl and Aop are the finite
action spaces of the two agents. To choose actions, the Player uses a stochastic policy pipl : S ×Apl → [0, 1] and the
Opponent uses piop : S ×Aop → [0, 1], which together produce the next state according to the state transition function
T : S × S ×Apl ×Aop → [0, 1]. As a consequence of simultaneously taking these actions, the agents receive a reward
R : S × Apl ×Aop → [Rmin, Rmax]. The constant γ ∈ (0, 1) represents the reward discount factor across time. For
zero-sum games, the Player seeks to maximize the total expected reward, whereas the Opponent seeks to minimize it.
We denote the value at each state induced by the policy pair pi = (pipl, piop) as Vpi(s) = Epis
[∑∞
t=0 γ
tR(st, aplt , aopt )
]
.
Nash Equilibrium. The classical solution to a zero-sum stochastic game is the Nash equilibrium (NE) [21]. Operating at
a NE, no agent can gain by unilaterally deviating from the equilibrium. Even though multiple Nash equilibria could exist
in a zero-sum SG, the optimal value at a NE is unique and can be computed [7] via V∗(s) = maxpipl minpiop Vpi
plpiop(s).
The resulting optimal Q-value at a NE is then computed via Q∗(s, apl, aop) = R(s, apl, aop) + γEs′ [V∗(s′)].
Minimax Q-Learning. The unique value property of zero-sum games enables the development of algorithms that learn
the NE of such games similarly to Q-learning [35]. The Minimax-Q algorithm [13] learns the optimal Q-value for a
ii
A PREPRINT - SEPTEMBER 2, 2020
zero-sum game via the following learning rule:
Qt+1(st, aplt , aopt )← (1− αt)Qt(st, aplt , aopt ) + αt
[
R(st, aplt , aopt )
+ γmax
pipl
min
aop
∑
apl∈Apl
Qt(st+1, apl, aop)pipl
(
apl|st+1
)]
,
(1)
where the max-min optimization problem is normally solved as a linear program [36]. Performing these optimizations
at each learning step is inefficient especially at the beginning of the learning process, when the Q-values are inaccurate.
Soft Q-Learning. Soft Q-learning was originally introduced to reduce the maximization bias of standard Q-learning [18]
and for constructing flexible entropy-regulated policies [37]. Two-agent Soft-Q [19] introduces two entropy-regulation
terms to the reward structure in (2) and thus restricts the policy exploration to a neighborhood of the given priors. Given
the policies pipl and piop of the two agents, the soft-value function is defined as in (2) with βpl > 0 and βop < 0
Vpipl,piopKL (s) = Epi
pl,piop
s
[ ∞∑
t=0
γt
(
R(st, aplt , aopt )−
1
βpl
log
pipl(aplt |st)
ρpl(aplt |st)
− 1
βop
log
piop(aopt |st)
ρop(aopt |st)
)]
, (2)
where ρpl(apl|s) and ρop(aop|s) are some prior policies for the Player and the Opponent, respectively.
Similar to unregulated zero-sum stochastic games, the unique soft-optimal value of entropy-regulated games is
defined via V∗KL(s) = maxpipl minpiop Vpi
pl,piop
KL (s), and the soft-optimal Q-value is defined as Q∗KL(s, apl, aop) :=R(s, apl, aop) + γEs′ [V∗KL(s′)]. It has been shown in [19] that the optimal strategies of an entropy-regulated game can
be computed as follows. The Player first marginalizes Q∗KL via
Qpl,∗KL (s, apl) =
1
βop
log
∑
aop∈Aop
ρop(aop|s) exp (βopQ∗KL(s, apl, aop)) , (3)
and then she obtains her soft-optimal policy from
pipl,∗KL (a
pl|s) = 1
Zpl(s)
ρpl(apl|s) exp (βplQpl,∗KL (s, apl)), (4)
where Zpl(s) is the normalizing factor. The Opponent’s marginalization and her soft-optimal policy are defined
symmetrically. The policies in (4) take the form of a Boltzmann distribution, where βpl is the inverse temperature. As
βpl goes to zero, the entropy-regularization term in (2) dominate the reward structure and the soft-optimal policy of the
Player collapses to its prior. On the other hand, as the magnitude of βpl tends to infinity, the Player chooses the action(s)
that maximizes the marginalized Q-value. Essentially, for large values of βpl and βop the algorithm trusts the Q-values
more than the priors, and vice versa for small values of βpl and βop.
Based on the Player’s marginalized soft-optimal Q-values in (3), the game’s soft-optimal Q-value Q∗KL(s, apl, aop) can
be learnt via the recursive rule [19]
QKL,t+1(st, aplt , aopt )← (1− ηt)QKL,t(st, aplt ,aopt ) + ηt
[
R(st, aplt , aopt )
+
γ
βpl
log
∑
apl
ρpl(apl|s) exp [βplQpl,∗KL (s, apl)]]. (5)
4 Two-Agent Soft Nash Q2-Learning
Figure 1: Schematic of SNQ2.
In this section, we present the two-agent Soft Nash Q2-Learning algorithm
(SNQ2). As the name suggests, the algorithm relies on two different Q-values:
one is the standard Q-value and the other one is the soft Q-value. A schematic
of the algorithm is presented in Figure 1.
Learning Rule for QKL. The learning rule of QKL is presented in (5). The priors
are updated periodically using the Nash policies as indicated by the red arrow in
Figure 1.
Learning Rule for Q. To learn the standard Q-values, we apply the following
update rule recursively [13, 14]
Qt+1(st, aplt , aopt )← (1− αt)Qt(st, aplt , aopt ) + αt
[R(st, aplt , aopt ) + γVt(st+1)] , (6)
iii
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where Vt(st+1) is the estimated optimal value based on the current Q-values at learning step t. We employ two methods
to compute Vt. The soft update (7) uses the entropy-regulated soft-optimal policies as an approximation to update the
value. The Nash update (8) resembles Minimax-Q and computes the Nash value via optimization.
Soft Update: Vt(s) =
∑
apl
∑
aop
Qt(s, apl, aop) piplKL,t(apl|s) piopKL,t(aop|s), (7)
Nash Update: Vt(s) = max
pipl
min
aop
∑
apl
Qt(s, apl, aop)pipl
(
apl|s). (8)
The soft update is used most frequently and is indicated by the blue arrow in Figure 1. The Nash update is applied only
periodically and is indicated by the black dashed arrow.
Nash Prior Updates. In addition to updating the value function using the soft update and the Nash update as in (7) and
(8), the proposed SNQ2 algorithm also updates the priors required by the QKL as in (3) periodically. Given the current
Q-value, one can find the Nash policies at each state by solving the following two Linear Programming problems [7]
max v, min u,
subject to v1T − pipl(s)TQt(s) ≤ 0, subject to u1−Qt(s)piop(s) ≥ 0,
1Tpipl(s) = 1, pipl(s) ≥ 0, 1Tpiop(s) = 1, piop(s) ≥ 0,
(9)
where pi(s) is the policy cast in vector form andQ(s) is the reward matrix at state s. We denote the solutions to (9)
as piplNash,t(s) and pi
op
Nash,t(s), respectively, which are used to update the priors. The periodic Nash prior update is
represented by the red dashed arrow in Figure 1. By default SNQ2 is initialized with uniform priors, according to the
principle of maximum entropy [38].
We summarize the Soft Nash Q2-Learning algorithm in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: Soft Nash Q2-Learning Algorithm
1 Inputs: Priors ρ, Learning rates α and η; initial prior update episode M = ∆M0; Nash update frequency T ;
2 SetQ(s, apl, aop) = QKL(s, apl, aop) = 0 for all states s and actions apl, aop;
3 Set βpl and βop to some large values;
4 whileQ not converged do
5 while episode i not end do
6 Collect transition (st, aplt , a
op
t , rt, st+1) where a
pl
t ∼ piplKL(st), aopt ∼ piopKL(st);
7 if t mod T == 0 then
8 Compute V(st+1) = maxpipl minaop
∑
apl Q(st+1, apl, aop)pipl
(
apl|st+1
)
;
9 else
10 Compute V(st+1) = piplKL(st+1)T Q(st+1) piopKL(st+1) ;
11 end
12 UpdateQ(st, aplt , aopt ) via (6);
13 UpdateQKL(st, aplt , aopt ) via (5);
14 end
15 if i == M then
16 Compute piplNash(s) and pi
op
Nash(s) using Nash solver (9) based on currentQ for all states s;
17 ρplnew ← piplNash, ρopnew ← piopNash;
18 ∆M,βnew = DynamicSchedule
(
ρplnew, ρ
op
new, ρ
pl, ρop, βpl, βop,∆M,Q) as in Algorithm 2;
19 M += ∆M ;
20 Update ρpl ← ρplnew, ρop ← ρopnew, βpl ← βplnew, βop ← βopnew;
21 Decrease learning rates α and η;
22 end
23 end
24 returnQ(s, apl, aop).
4.1 Scheduling of the Hyper-parametersM and β
As presented in Algorithm 1, the trade-off between computation efficiency and approximation accuracy is embedded in
the prior update frequency and the Nash update frequency. Intuitively, when the new Nash priors are close to the old
iv
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ones, the algorithm is close to convergence. In this situation, the prior update frequency should be decreased (increase
∆M ) and the algorithm should trust and exploit the priors (decrease βop and βpl).
The default number of episodes between two Nash prior policy updates ∆M0 and the default decay rate of the inverse
temperature λ ∈ (0, 1) are first computed as
∆M0 =
Nstates ×Naction pairs
α0 × Tmax , λ =
(
βend
β0
)1/Nupdates
,
where α0 is the initial learning rate and Tmax is the maximum length of a learning episode; β0 and βend are the initial
and estimated final inverse temperatures for both βop and βpl, and Nupdates is the estimated number of prior updates.
This value of ∆M0 allows the algorithm to properly explore the state and action spaces so that the first prior update
is performed with an informed Q-function. In our numerical experiments we found that β0 = 20, βend = 0.1 and
Nupdates = 10 are good set of values.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the dynamic scheduling scheme, where the parameter σ ∈ (0, 1) is a decrease factor and
RelativeDifference captures the performance difference between old and new priors.
Algorithm 2: Dynamic Schedule for M and β
1 Inputs: old and new priors ρ, ρnew; old prior update length ∆M ; old inverse temperatures β; currentQ;
2 Compute Vold(s) = [ρpl(s)]TQ(s)ρop(s) and Vnew(s) = [ρplnew(s)]TQ(s)ρopnew(s), for all s;
3 Compute RelativeDifference(s) = |Vnew(s)− Vold(s)|
/ |Vnew(s)|;
4 Count the number of states n, where RelativeDifference(s) < δ;
5 if n/|S| ≥ Threshold then
6 ∆M = min{ 1
σ
∆M,∆Mmax}, βnew = max{λ βold, βmin};
7 else
8 ∆M = max{σ∆M,∆Mmin}, βnew = βold;
9 end
10 return ∆M , βnew.
4.2 Warm-Starting
One can warm-start the proposed SNQ2 algorithm by first initializing the priors ρpl and ρop based on some previously
learnt policies or on expert demonstrations, and then also postponing the first prior update to exploit these priors. Using
a prior policy instead of the value to warm-start the algorithm has two major advantages: first, human demonstrations
can be converted into prior policies in a more streamlined manner than into value information; second, prior policies
provide more consistent guidance than the values, as the priors are not updated till the first prior policy update. We
demonstrate the effect of transferring previous training experience in Section 5.
5 Numerical Experiments
To evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm, we tested and compared SNQ2 with several existing algorithms
(Minimax-Q [13], WoLF-PHC [12], Single-Q [22]) for three zero-sum game environments: a two-agent Pursuit-Evasion
Game (PEG) [39], in which the Pursuer aims to capture the Evader; a sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor game (sRPS), in
which the two agents play Rock-Paper-Scissor repeatedly till one gets four consecutive wins; and a Soccer game as
in [13].
5.1 Evaluation Criteria
Two metrics were used to evaluate the performance of the algorithms: the number of states achieving a NE and the
running time1. For each game, we computed four different value functions and compare them to determine whether a
state has achieved a NE: (1) the ground truth Nash value VNash solved exactly via Shapley’s method [7]; (2) the learnt
value VLearn; (3) the one-sided MDP value VplLearn computed by fixing the Opponent to her learnt policy and letting the
Player maximize; (4) the one-sided MDP value VopLearn. We assume that the learnt policies achieve a NE at state s, if∣∣∣VNash(s)− VLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ <  ∧
∣∣∣VNash(s)− VplLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ <  ∧
∣∣∣VNash(s)− VopLearn(s)∣∣∣∣∣VNash(s)∣∣ < . (10)
1The single-threaded experiments were run in a Python environment with AMD Ryzen 1920x and 32G 2666MHz RAM. Scipy’s
optimization linprog (a simplex method) is used to solve the matrix games at each state.
v
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Here, we pick a tolerance of  = 0.03. Notice that the evaluation criterion in (10) is stricter than simply collecting
empirical win rates of different agents competing in the environment as in [13, 40], since any deviation from the NE
could be exploited by either agent in our criteria.
5.2 The Game Environments
Pursuit-Evasion. The pursuit-evasion game (PEG) is played on 4×4, 6×6 and 8×8 grids, as depicted in Figure 2.
Both agents seek to avoid collision with the obstacles (marked in black). The Pursuer strives to capture the Evader by
being in the same cell as the Evader. The goal of the Evader is to reach one of the evasion cells (marked in red) without
being captured. Two agents simultaneously choose one of four actions on each turn: N, S, E, and W. Each executed
action results in a stochastic transition of the agent’s position. In the default setting, an agent has a 60% chance of
successfully moving to its intended cell and a 40% chance of landing in the cell to the left of the intended direction.
The 4×4 and 8×8 PEGs use the default transitions and the 6×6 PEG uses deterministic transitions. In such setting, a
deterministic policy cannot be a Nash policy.
Figure 2: The grids of the three pursuit-evasion games.
Soccer. The soccer game [13] is played on a 4×5 grid as in Figure 3. Two agents, A and B, can choose one of five
actions on each turn: N, S, E, W, and Stand, and the two actions selected are executed in random order. The circle
represents the ball. When the agent with the ball steps in to the goal (left for A and right for B), that player scores and
the game restarts at a random state. When an agent executes an action that would take it to the cell occupied by the other
agent, possession of the ball goes to the stationary agent. Littman [13] argued that the Nash policies must be stochastic.
Sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor. In a sequential Rock-Paper-Scissor game (sRPS), two agents (pl and op) play Rock-
Paper-Scissor repeatedly. One episode ends when one of the two agents wins four consecutive games. The states and
transitions are shown in Figure 3. State s0 corresponds to the initial state where no one has won a single RPS game, and
states s4 and s8 are the winning (terminal) states of pl and op respectively. The Nash policies of sPRS at each state are
uniform for both agents.
Figure 3: The grid of the soccer game (left) and the state transition diagram of sRPS (right).
5.3 Comparison to Existing Methods
We implemented and evaluated SNQ2 on the game environments presented in Section 5.2 using the evaluation criteria
in Section 5.1. The SNQ2 algorithm was initialized with two types of priors, a uniform prior 2 (SNQ2-U) and a previous
experience (SNQ2-PE). Previous experience for PEGs and Soccer is learnt in a training session of the same game but
with a different dynamics. For sRPS, the previous experience is a perturbed uniform strategy. The algorithm also has
the option of a fixed schedule (SNQ2-FS) and a dynamic schedule (SNQ2-DS). Unless otherwise specified, SNQ2
uses a dynamic schedule. SNQ2 was compared with three popular alternative algorithms, namely, Minimax-Q, Soft-Q,
WoLF-PHC and Single-Q. We fine-tuned these algorithms to get the best performance so as to demonstrate their actual
capabilities. We summarize the performance in terms of convergence of these algorithms on the five game environments
in Figure 4.
2For sRPS, the default prior is randomly generated, as uniform policies are the Nash policy for this game.
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Figure 4: Comparison of performance at convergence (left) and computation time (right) for all algorithms. All results
are averaged over ten runs. The computation time on the right is normalized by that of Minimax-Q. We cut off the
computation at 600,000 episodes for 8×8 PEG, due to the large state space. In most of the experiments, SNQ2 achieves
a slightly better convergence to NE than Minimax-Q, while exhibiting an significant reduction in computation time.
Soft-Q has relatively good performance in four of the games but fails to converge in sRPS. Single-Q and WoLF-PHC
are fast but fail to converge to NE in all five games hence are not shown in the right plot.
The sRPS game with a uniform Nash equilibrium shows that SNQ2 is capable of converging to a fully mixed strategy. In
this game, Soft-Q learning fails to converge to the uniform NE, as its reward structure is regularized as in (2); Single-Q
learning tries to learn a pure policy but does not converge; WoLF-PHC converges to NE at state s3 and s7 but with large
value deviation, which propagates to other states and results in poor policies.
We then examine the 4×4 PEG game. Despite the relatively small state space, the stochastic transition at all non-terminal
states requires extensive exploration of the environment. We plot the convergence trends over 300,000 episodes and
over 12,000 seconds for Minimax-Q and SNQ2 in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Convergence trends of different algorithms in 4×4 PEG.
The time to convergence in Figure 5(b) demonstrates the expedited convergence of SNQ2 in terms of computation time.
The episode-wise trend is depicted in Figure 5(a), where it is shown that SNQ2 maintains the same level of convergence
performance as Minimax-Q, albeit with significantly reduced computation time. This shows that our entropy-regulated
policy approximation approach is both accurate and computationally efficient. The performance oscillation of SNQ2 at
the beginning is the result of the first few prior updates. As the Q-values are inaccurate at the beginning, the priors
generated by these Q-values are also not accurate, which has long-lasting effects on the subsequent value updates as
seen in Figure 5(a). Thus, updating the priors based solely on the current Q-values may be detrimental to performance.
We have conducted experiments of using Polyak-averaging on the Q-values and the results showed that averaging does
indeed alleviate the initial oscillations.
5.4 Effect of Warm-Starting
Figure 6: The convergence performance at cutoff
times for 4×4 (left) and 8×8 (right) PEGs.
In PEGs, the agents learn their previous experience in the same
grid but with a 75% success rate. To reduce overfitting to the
previous environment, the prior policy fed to the agent for a
new training session is the average of the previously learnt
policy and a uniform policy. As seen in Figure 5(b), previous
experience does not shorten the time till convergence but instead
significantly reduces the time to reach a reasonable performance.
We plot the cutoff time performance of the 4×4 and 8×8 PEGs
in Figure 6. In the 4×4 example the time to reach over 90%
Nash convergence is halved from 1,200 seconds with uniform
vii
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prior down to 600 seconds with previous experience. In the 8×8 example the time to reach 80% convergence was halved
from 7,200 seconds to 3,600 seconds. One also observes from Figure 5(a) that the policies generated by SNQ2 with
previous experience converge, episode-wise, slightly faster than Minimax-Q. This “warm-start” feature has appealing
real-world applications, where the number of episodes interacting with the environment is the main constraint instead
of computation time. In this case, one can first train prior policies using a simulator and use these as priors to the agents.
With SNQ2 one can train the agents to a reasonable performance in fewer episodes, while maintaining a relatively low
computation overhead.
5.5 Effect of Dynamic Scheduling
The effectiveness of dynamic scheduling is demonstrated in Figure 5(a) for the case of the 4×4 PEG where it is shown
that dynamic scheduling reduced the number of episodes till convergence. For 6×6 PEG and Soccer, which have
less stochasticity, dynamic scheduling improves the performance of the algorithm at convergence, as seen in Figure 7.
Dynamic scheduling also reduces the length that SNQ2 exploits a potentially bad prior when the Q-values are far from
convergence, especially at the beginning. As the initial learning rate is large, a Q-value based on a bad prior policy
could be difficult to correct later on. The proposed dynamic scheduling also reduces the prior policy update frequency
when the algorithm is close to convergence and thus reduces oscillations, as demonstrated in Figure 5.
Figure 7: Convergence trends of algorithms in different environments.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We have proposed a new algorithm for solving zero-sum games where the agents use entropy-regularized policies
to approximate the Nash policies and thus reduce computation time till convergence. Empirically, the proposed
algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium as demonstrated using several stochastic games of different sizes and
levels of stochasticity. Our numerical experiments showed that the algorithm significantly reduces computation time
while maintaining a good performance, when compared with other algorithms, such as Minimax-Q, WoLF-PHC, and
independent Q-learning. The performance of the algorithm can be improved by applying a dynamic scheduling scheme
of the prior update frequency and the annealing of inverse temperature. We also demonstrated the effectiveness of
warm-starting in a new environment using previous experience.
For future work, we wish to combine SNQ2 with deep learning in order to tackle more complicated games and extend
this idea to continuous state and action spaces. We would also like to extend the current algorithm to generalized-sum
games and games with more than two agents.
viii
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